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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court the final order of the Utah District Court is appealable
and jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant

to

Utah

Code Ann.

Section

78-2-2(j)

(1953 as

amended)•

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A.

Does the Utah District Court have the authority

and/or power to invalidate a California Court order and
judgment with regard to California State real property?
B.

Does the Utah District Court have jurisdiction over

real property located in the State of California in probate
proceedings?
C.

Where a conflict of probate laws exists between the

deceased's state of domicile and the state where the deceased
owns real property, which law takes precedence?
D.

Did the Utah District Court abuse its discretion by

ordering the personal representative of the deceased's estate
to reobtain and redistribute property already distributed
pursuant to an order and judgment of the California Superior
Court?
E.

Is the judgment of the California Superior Court res

judicata with regard to the issue of California real property
and therefore entitled to full faith and credit by the Utah
courts.
1

F.

Should the personal representative be required to

file a bond for property not includeable in the Utah estate of
the deceased and already distributed pursuant to a current
court order?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The order of the District Court below was made as a
matter of law and therefore the Supreme Court is not required
to accept the conclusions of the District Court but shall
review the questions of law independently. Avila v. Winn, 794
P.2d 20 (Utah 1990); Henrettv v. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d
506 (Utah 1990).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are no Utah statutes determinative of the issues
upon appeal before the Court and this appears to be a matter
of first impression in the State.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from a final order of the Third
Judicial

District

Court,

for the District

of Utah, the

Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, wherein the Court found
as a matter of law a prior judgment of a California Superior
Court "wholly invalid" with regard to California real property
and ordered said property redistributed according to Utah Law
2

and further ordered the Personal Representative to post bond
in an amount equal to one-half of the value of said California
real property.

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case

Below.
At

trial

held

before

the

Third

District

Court

in

February, 1986, the will of the deceased was upheld and his
estate passed to Linda Anglesey.

Said judgment was appealed

by Appellee Robert Lee Jones (hereinafter "Jones") who had
been disinherited and reversed on the issue of his status as
a pretermitted child and remanded for further proceedings
before the District Court.
Subsequent

to the above-referenced

trial, ancillary

proceedings were brought in the Superior Court of California
regarding California real property owned by the deceased. The
California court held that pursuant to California law, Jones
was disinherited and distributed said real property to Linda
Anglesey.
In compliance with the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals, Personal Representative Linda Anglesey prepared a
Final Accounting awarding one-half

(1/2) of all personal

property of the deceased as well as one-half (1/2) of all real
property

located

California

real

in the State of Utah
property,

previously

to Jones.

distributed

The

by the

California Superior Court, was not included in said Final

3

Accounting.

Personal Representative Linda Anglesey further

petitioned the Court to close the estate.
Jones objected to the Final Accounting and Petition to
Close the Estate and Counter-petitioned that the Personal
Representative be removed or in the alternative that a
personal representative's bond be required.

Said Counter-

Petition was objected to by the estate and by Personal
Representative Linda Anglesey.
Third District Court Judge James S. Sawaya, upon hearing,
held that as a matter of law the judgment of the California
Superior Court was "wholly invalid", that Jones was entitled
to one-half (1/2) of the California real property, and that
the Personal Representative was required to post a bond for
one-half

(1/2) of the estate.

This is in appeal by the

estate, by and through Personal Representative Linda Anglesey,
of said final order.

C.

Statement of Facts.

1.

On May 1, 1985, Herbert Lee Jones (hereinafter "the

deceased") executed a Last Will and Testament prior to his
death on July 5, 1985.
2.

Said

written

will

named

Petitioner

Linda

M.

(Cameron) Anglesey "to be Executor [Sic] and sole beneficiary
to my Estate".
3.
daughter

Petitioner Linda M. (Cameron) Anglesey, Testator's
(hereinafter

"Linda Anglesey"
4

or

"the Personal

Representative")

filed

a

Petition

for

Formal

Probate

subsequent thereto on July 19, 1985 to which an Objection was
filed by Robert Lee Jones, (hereinafter "Jones") Testator's
son, claiming that the Testator lacked testamentary capacity,
that Linda Anglesey had exerted undue influence over the
Testator and that Jones was a pretermitted child pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-302(1)(a).
4.

Trial

was

held

before

the

Honorable

Homer

F.

Wilkinson of the Third District Court on February 10, 1986,
After full presentation of the evidence, the court found that
the Testator had the capacity to execute a will in May, 1985;
that he was not unduly influenced on said date; that the
entire will was completed May 1, 1985; and that the language
of the will was sufficient to show that the Testator intended
to disinherit his son and therefore Robert Lee Jones was not
a pretermitted child pursuant to Utah law. (R.at 110-110).
5.

On April 15, 1986 the Court entered the Formal

Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal Representative of
Linda Anglesey. (R. at 114-115).
6.

Thereafter, an ancillary proceeding was filed by the

Personal Representative Linda Anglesey in the Superior Court
of the State of California, County of Los Angeles for the
distribution of the deceased's real property located in the
State of California. (R. at 554-561).
1.

Jones

was

provided

notice

of

said

ancillary

proceeding, and all proceedings in conjunction thereto. (R. at
5

554-561).
8.

A hearing upon said ancillary proceeding was held

November 7, 1987 before California Superior Court Judge J.
Kimball Walker wherein the Court found that the decedent
intended to omit his son Robert Lee Jones from his Will and
that

pursuant

to

California

lawf

the

entirety

of

the

California real property in the estate would be distributed to
Linda Anglesey. (R. at 530-538, 448-454). Said Decree was not
appealed nor did Jones appear at any of said proceedings. (R.
at 549, 554 - 561).
9.

The judgment of the above-referenced Utah District

Court decision, however, was appealed by Jones, and the Utah
Court of Appeals, in a written opinion, ruled that all aspects
of the lower court's decision would be affirmed with the
exception of the pretermitted child issue.

The Court of

Appeals found that Jones was pretermitted child pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. Section 75-2-302 (l)(a) and remanded the case
for entry of judgment consistent with such a finding.
costs were awarded.

No

Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345

(Utah App. 1988).
10.
submitted

Personal Representative Linda Anglesey thereafter
a Petition

for Entry

of Order

and

Decree in

Accordance with Decision of Utah Court of Appeals and Petition
for Approval

of Final Settlement, Discharge

of Personal

Representative and Closing the Administration of the Estate as
well as a Summary of Account for all real property of the
6

decedent's estate located in the State of Utah and all
personal

property

of

the

decedent's

estate

wheresoever

situated. (R. at 416-420).
11.

All real property of the decedent located in the

State of California has been distributed in accordance with
the ancillary proceeding filed in that state and the court
decree therefrom and was not included in said Summary of
Account. (R. at 421-422).
12.
Petition

Jones objected to the Personal Representative's
and

counter-petitioned

the

court

for an

order

removing Linda Anglesey as Personal Representative of the
deceased's estate, appointing Robert Lee Jones as Personal
Representative or in the alternative requiring that Personal
Representative Linda Anglesey file a bond in the amount of
one-half (1/2) the value of the estate. (R. at 461-471).
13.

Personal Representative Linda Anglesey objected to

Robert Lee Jones' Counter-Petition on the grounds that the
Utah estate had nothing to distribute after the payment of
debts and therefore a bond was unnecessary. (R. at 480-485).
14.
ordered

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup of the Third District Court
that

the

Personal

Representative

be

temporarily

restrained from further transferring or disposing of the
estate property pending resolution of the matter. (R. at 473476).
15.

On January 16, 1990 hearing on the above-referenced

petitions was held before the Honorable James S. Sawaya of the
7

Third District Court. Without discussing any of the issues of
fact, the Court ruled as a matter of law that the California
judgment was wholly invalid, that the California real property
was includeable in the Utah estate, that each distributee was
entitled to one-half of such, and that a bond should be filed
by Personal Representative Linda Anglesey for one-half (1/2)
of said estate. (R. at 550 - 552).
16.

The estate of the deceased Herbert Lee Jones, by and

through its Personal Representative Linda Anglesey, appealed
the order of the District as inconsistent with the previously
entered order and judgment of the California Court. (R. at
562).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The courts have been nearly unanimous in upholding the
principles set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1900 that a
foreign court is without subject matter jurisdiction to affect
the title of real property located outside its territorial
limits. This has been especially true in cases involving the
probate of a will where real property is left in a state other
than the domicile of the deceased, and a conflict of laws
exists between the states regarding said probate estate.

In

such cases the courts have uniformly held that the law and
judgment of the situs state controls.
In some instances, foreign state courts have attempted to
use their personal jurisdiction over the parties to avoid the
8

above principle, or argued that the first judgment entered
must be granted "full faith and credit" regardless of the
location of the real property.

Such attempts and arguments

however have been unsuccessful and the courts have refused to
make exceptions to said principles.
Utah, therefore, must guard its own sovereignty and not
throw away its exclusive jurisdiction over real property
located in Utah by adopting law to the contrary regarding
foreign

situated

real

property.

This

is

particularly

important where Utah can only enforce such a law where it has
personal jurisdiction over the necessary parties.
Finally, the order of the court below requiring a
personal representatives bond is unnecessary and inappropriate
as there is no property within the Utah estate of the
deceased, the California property is not includeable therein,
and attempting

to coerce the return of property already

distributed by the California courts by means of personal
jurisdiction over the distributee is contrary to common law
and an inappropriate exercise of juridical authority.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT MAY NOT INVALIDATE THE JUDGMENT OF
A CALIFORNIA COURT REGARDING CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY
The United States Supreme Court referred to the following
as a "well-defined and elementary legal principle".

9

It is a doctrine firmly established that
the law of a state in which land is
situated
controls
and
governs
it
transmission by will or its passage in
case of intestacy. Clarke v. Clarke 178
U.S. 186, 190, 20 S.Ct 873, 44 L.Ed. 1028
(1900). (String cite omitted).
Such black letter law has been long established regarding
real property as devised by will.

The Restatement 2d of

Conflicts provides as follows:
Section 240.
Devising Land.

Construction of a Will

1.
A will insofar as it devises an
interest in land is construed in accordance with the rules of construction of
the state designated for this purpose in
the will.
2.
In the absence of such a
designation, the will is construed in
accordance with the rules of construction
that would be applied by the courts of
the situs.
Section 239. Validity and Effect of Will
of Land.
1.
Whether a will transfers an
interest in land and the nature of the
interest transferred are determined by
the law that would be applied by the
courts of the situs.
2.
These courts would usually apply their
own local law in determining such questions.
The policy behind the above principles is obvious.
States, which so jealously guard their sovereignty, must be
permitted to control the disposition of real property within
their borders.

10

A.
The U.S. Supreme Court Case of Clarke v. Clarke is
the Cornerstone Case Involving the Subject Conflict of Laws
Issue.
Although decided in 1900, the Clarke case Supra has never
been reversed nor modified.

In Clarke a conflict of laws

existed between the state of South Carolina where the deceased
was domiciled and Connecticut where the deceased owned real
property at the time of her death.

The Supreme Court of

Errors of Connecticut had held that, while the disposition of
personal

property might

be governed

by the

law of the

domicile, real estate within Connecticut was controlled by the
law of Connecticut.
The appellant in Clarke argued unsuccessfully that a
conflicting decision of a South Carolina Court pre-dated that
of the Connecticut Courts and therefore the decree of the
South

Carolina

court

construing

the

willf

and

not

Connecticut's own laws of construction, should determine the
rights of the parties as to Connecticut real estate.
The United States Supreme Court concluded, however, that:
[t]his is but to contend that what cannot
be done directly can be accomplished by
indirection, and that the fundamental
principle which gives to a sovereignty an
exclusive jurisdiction over the land
within its borders is in legal effect
dependent upon the nonexistence of a
decree of a court of another sovereignty
determining the status of such land.
Manifestly, however, an authority cannot
be said to be exclusive, or even to exist
at all, where its exercise may be
frustrated at any time. Id at 1992.

11

In the case at bar, Appellee Jones contends that Utah has
granted itself jurisdiction over all real property wheresoever
situated by virtue of Utah Code Ann. Section 75-1-201(33) and
urged the District Court to use its personal jurisdiction over
Personal Representative Anglesey to force her to reobtain
possession of the California real property for the estate.
Not surprisingly such is only possible because Linda Anglesey
is also sole devisee of said real property. Such a situation,
however, was foreseen by the Court in Clarke which reasoned as
follows:
If, however, by the law as enforced in
Connecticut, land in Connecticut owned by
Mrs. Clarke at her decease was real
estate for all purposes, despite the
provisions contained in her will, that
land was a subject matter not directly
amendable to the jurisdiction of the
Courts of another state, however, much
those courts might indirectly affect and
operate upon it in controversies where
the court, by reason of its jurisdiction
over persons and the nature of the
controversy, might coerce the execution
of a conveyance of or other instrument
encumbering such land. Id. at 193.
The situation feared by the U.S. Supreme Court has
actually occurred in the present case.

The District has

ordered a redistribution of the California real property and
intends to enforce said order by requiring the Personal
Representative to post a bond to insure such redistribution.
The Court in Clarke, however affirmed the decision of the
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors specifically holding that
the

courts

of

South

Carolina
12

had

no

subject

matter

jurisdiction over the Connecticut real property.

Id. at 195

(string cite omitted).
Although the Utah Courts do not appear to have addressed
these issues before, the above principles have been followed
and upheld by a number of the other courts.

Indeed, the

Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that, "[t]he cases on the
subject are numerous and so nearly unanimous that it would be
useless to attempt to discuss them all". In Re Ray's Estate,
287 P.2d 629, 635 (Wyo. 1955). The Wyoming Court then went on
to state that "(they) regard it then as settled law that the
devolution of real property in this state and the effect of
the decedent's will must be determined by the laws of this
state".

Id.

B.
A Foreign Court has no Jurisdiction Over Property
Not Found Within its Territorial Limits.
The Courts in Clarke supra and the cases that followed
have uniformly centered on the question of subject matter
jurisdiction in denying foreign courts the right to adjudicate
the disposition of foreign real property. The case of Durfee
v.

Duke. 375 U.S. 106, 107-108, 845 S.Ct. 242, 243 (1963)

involves a dispute over bottomland on the Missouri River.
Because the river is also the boundary between the states of
Nebraska

and

Missouri

an

issue

on

appeal

dealt

with

jurisdiction. Justice Stewart of the U.S. Supreme Court began
his opinion with the basic undisputed premise that "[t]he
Nebraska court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
13

controversy only if the land in question was in Nebraska".
In the case of Welch v. Trustees of Robert A. Welch
Foundation. 465 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex.App. 1971) involving the
courts

of two

(2) states

interpreting

the will

of the

deceased, the Texas Court of Appeals began by validating the
principles set forth in Clarke and then went on to discuss the
effect of a prior ruling from another state regarding Texas
real property from an earlier case decided by the Texas
Supreme Court:
The mere fact that the courts of Ohio happen to
have acted first in the matter is no more
persuasive to us than the converse situation would
be to the Ohio courts . . . Courts of a state which
is not the situs of the land involved in a
questioned devise, or devise in trust, are,
generally speaking, without right to apply a law
different from that of the situs, and their
judgments assuming such a right are not protected
by the "Full Faith and Credit" clause of the
Federal Constitution, Art. 4, Section 1. Toledo
Society for Crippled Children v. Hickok, 152 Tex.
758, 261 S*W.2d 692 (1953).
This result is not surprising as the full faith and
credit doctrine requires a foreign court to have subject
matter jurisdiction, Pur fee v. Duke Supra at 111, and such
jurisdiction is lacking with regard to real property outside
of a foreign courts territorial limits.
One of the most recent cases affirming the principles in
Clarke is that of Haves v. Gulf Oil Corp., 821 F.2d 285 (5th
Cir. 1987).

In Haves, the Fifth Circuit Federal Court was

forced to examine whether a Federal District Court could
exercise

subject

matter

jurisdiction
14

over

real

property

situated outside of its territorial boundaries by virtue of
its diversity jurisdiction over the parties.
action

rule" discussed

by the Court

The "local

is similar to the

conflicts issues above in that it:
". . . prevents courts unfamiliar with local
property rights and laws from interfering with
title to real property which must be recorded under
a unitary set of rules to keep it free of
conflicting encumbrances. These local rules ensure
that real property actions will be tried in a
convenient forum and that orderly notice to all
interested parties - through Colorado land title
records - will be facilitated." Ld. at 290
In

denying

the

Federal

District

Court's

claim

of

jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit stated as follows: "In short,
overwhelming precedent, including cases from this Circuit,
which hold that a court sitting in one state cannot adjudicate
title to land situated in a different state, and numerous
salutary reasons for continuing the local action rule to
determine subject matter jurisdiction, compel reversal of the
district court's judgment."

Id.

In the matter before this Court, the California Superior
Court has already demonstrated its unwillingness to allow Utah
courts jurisdiction over California real property.

Even

though, at the time the California ancillary proceeding was
initiated, a Utah Third District Court Decision awarding all
property

of

the

subject

estate

to

Linda

Anglesey

and

disinheriting Jones had been entered, the California Superior
Court refused to grant the Utah judgment full faith and
credit. A full evidentiary hearing was held by the California
15

Court, despite the fact that no opposition to the claims of
Linda

Anglesey

had

been

filed,

on

the

issues

of

the

sufficiency of the will of the deceased an the effect of the
California pretermitted child statute.
It is clear from Clarke and its progeny, that any dispute
Jones

may

have

with

the

distribution

of

the

estate's

California real property, or the judgment of the California
courts,

cannot

be

bootstrapped

into

the

Utah

probate

proceeding, but must be directed to the courts with the
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over said property.
POINT II
THE STATE OF UTAH SHOULD NOT GIVE UP
THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THE DISPOSITION
OF REAL PROPERTY WITHIN THIS STATE
It should not be overlooked that a failure to reverse the
decision of the District Court below will have far reaching
effects on the Utah courts' ability to control the disposition
of real property within the state• Utah courts, in attempting
to indirectly affect property situated in California, must
implicitly endorse the same authority to courts outside of
Utah with regard to Utah property.
Moreover, opening the door to the control of Utah real
property by other states is a poor exchange for Utah.

While

Utah would be consigned to allowing any state to exert subject
matter

jurisdiction

over Utah real property,

in probate

matters in the very least, Utah would only be able to do the
same

in

situations

where

it
16

also

maintained

personal

jurisdiction over parties which could be forced to accept the
Utah Courts' mandates.

In the present case for example, had

the California real property been distributed to an individual
outside of the jurisdiction of the Utah, rather than the
Personal Representative Linda Anglesey, the District Court
could not have ordered a redistribution of the estate.
It is essential that Utah not erode the sovereignty of
the state by allowing the disposition of Utah real property to
be determined other than Utah law.

POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER TO POST A PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE'S BOND IS UNNECESSARY
Jones petitioned the court below for an order requiring
Personal Representative Linda Anglesey to post a personal
representative's bond based upon the premise that he is
entitled to one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased,
including all California real property.

As indicated in the

final accounting of the Personal Representative, the Utah
estate has no assets to distribute to any party.

In fact,

said Personal Representative was forced to pay a number of the
expenses and costs related to the death of her father out of
her own pocket.
The only assets that the District Court's order would
affect, therefore, would be the real property situated in
California. Requiring the Personal Representative to bond for
17

one-half

1/2)

of said property

is both unnecessary

inappropriate for the following reasons.

and

First, the real

property in question is no longer part of the estate of the
deceased, having been distributed pursuant to the ancillary
proceeding held in the California Superior Court and said
proceeding having been closed.
Second, as discussed above, the Utah District Court has
no subject matter jurisdiction over said California real
property and therefore has no power to require or affect the
transfer thereof. Finally, and also discussed above, the mere
fact that the Utah Third District Court maintains personal
jurisdiction over the distributee of said California property,
by virtue of her position as Personal Representative of the
Utah probate estate, does not also grant said Court the right
to coerce a transfer thereof and the District Courts attempt
to do so is inappropriate and contrary to established common
law.

CONCLUSION
Because a foreign court has no power or jurisdiction over
real property located outside of its territorial limits, the
law of the situs state, and even moreso the determination of
a court in the situs state, is controlling.
important

that

Utah

not

throw

away

its

Moreover, it is
own

exclusive

jurisdiction over Utah real property and in doing so erode to
a large measure its sovereignty.
18

WHEREFORE, Appellant/Petitioner, the estate of Herbert
Lee Jones, by and through Personal Representative Linda
Anglesey prays that the order of the Third District Court
below invalidating the judgment of a California Superior Court
regarding California real property, and requiring Personal
Representative

Linda

Anglesey

to

post

a

personal

representative's bond in the amount of one-half (1/2) the
value of said property be reversed.

Further, it is prayed

that the matter be remanded to the Third District Court with
the direction that the Personal Representative's Petition be
granted

and

the

Utah

probate

estate

be

closed

without

inclusion of the subject California real property therein.
DATED this / ? A day of December, 1991.
BROWN, LARSON, JENKINS & HALLIDAY

RicfhajM/L. 1 Halliday^
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(^ gay of December, 1991,

I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) copies of the foregoing to
the following:
R. Stephen Marshall
Thomas E. Nelson
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

^
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ADDENDUM

20

EXHIBIT A

1 WILFRED E. BRIESEMEISTER

FILED

Attorney at law

2 Greenleaf Square, Suite 370
7200 S. Greenleaf Avenue
3 Whittier, CA. 90602
C213) 945 6504

4
5 Attorney for Petitioner
6
7
8

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

9

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

10
11 Estate of
12
13
14

NO.

SEP 17587

DECREE DETERMINING INTERESTS
IN TESTATE ESTATE

HERBERT LEE JONES,
also known as HERBERT
L. JONES,

15
16

Deceased.

17
18

The petition of LINDA M. CAMERON, praying that the Court

19 determine who is entitled to distribution of the estate of
20 HERBERT LEE JONES, also known as HERBERT L. JONES, deceased,
21 came on regularly for hearing on the 4th day of November,
22 1987, at 9:00 A.M. in Department SE"W", the Honorable J,
23 KIMBALL WALKER, Judge Presiding. Upon proof satisfactory to the
24 Court, the Court finds that all notices of the time and place of
25
26
27
28

hearing were given as required by law, that no written statements
of Claimants were filed herein, and said matter having been heard,
evidence both oral and documentary having been introduced, and
gcpd czvse. appearing,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that decedent was aware
of the existence of his son, ROBERT LEE JONES, and that it was
decedent's intention to omit the son from decedent's Will, and
that upon proper petition for distribution, the entirety of
the estate shall be distributed to LINDA Mc CAMERON, daughter
of the decedent.
DATEDs

OECHB67
J. KIMBALL WALKER
Judge of the Superior Court

THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH THIS CERTIFICATE IS ATTACHED IS A FULLTCUF.AMD CCHRECT COPY OF THE
ORIGINAL ON'FILE AMD OF RECORD IN MY OFFICE.

DEC 1 A 1987
ATTEST

10

FRANK S. 2CL1N, County Clerk -nd L<c:-.-.i-r Cheer
o f t h " Superior Court of California, Cou„ty of Los

v©*_,v--tv. w w c-yj
s#:«v. M.

Angelas,

BY

kA^M.

DEPUTY

EXHIBIT B

1

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

2

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

3

DEPARTMENT SOUTHEAST W

HON. J. KIMBALL WALKER, JUDGE

4
5
In the Estate of
6
No. SE P 17587

HERBERT LEE JONES,
7
Deceased.
8
9
10
11
12
13

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

14

November 4, 19 87

15
16
17
18

APPEARANCES:

19

For the Executor:

20
21

WILFRED E.' BRIESEMEISTER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
7200 Greenleaf Avenue
Suite 37 0
Whittier, California 90602

22
23
24
25
26

ORIGINAL

27
28

WILLI D. HILL, CSR
Official Reporter

1

NORWALK, CALIFORNIA?

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 19 87; 9:00 AM

2

DEPARTMENT SOUTHEAST W

HON. J. KIMBALL WALKER, JUDGE

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

THE COURT?

No. 28, Herbert Jones, and No. 29,

Herbert Jones.
MR. BRIESEMEISTER:

Wilfred Briesemeister

representing the executor, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Have you been to the probate lawyer on

these matters?

10

MR. BRIESEMEISTER;

11

THE COURT: What did you find out about this Utah law

12
13
14

Yes, we have, Your Honor.

vis-a-vis California?
MR. BRIESEMEISTER:

I think, as I tried to clarify, I

think the probate attorney understood the distinction.

15

We are not asking the court to apply Utah law.

16

What we are merely indicating was that there was a finding

17

of fact in the matter which was pending before the Utah

18

probate court with regard to the intention of the

19

testator.

20

Now, we have here today a witness, the brother

21

of the testator, if Your Honor wishes to have an

22

evidentiary hearing, who would testify that the will

23

itself, by the four corners which specifies that the one

24

daughter be the sole heir, was intended by the testator to

25

exclude the remaining child, the son.

26

In addition, I have a sworn statement from the

27

testator's wife to indicate that the other two potential

28

pretermitted heirs were not in fact either natural children

1

of nor adopted children of testator.

2

THE COURT:

We will put that on second call as well,

3

counsel.

4

and we'll have to hear this later.

5

You have other documents which I have to read,

MR. BRIESEMEISTER:

6

(Proceedings were held in other matters.)

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BRIESEMEISTER:

9

Very well, Your Honor.

No. 28 and 29, Herbert Jones.
Wilfred Briesemeister appearing

on behalf of the executor, Your Honor.

10

We filed a 1080 petition in order to clarify the

11

issue of pretermitted heir, which was an objection to the

12

—

13

or by the probate attorney.
In addition, we have a witness who's the brother

14

of the decedent, and my offer as a matter of proof is that

15

his testimony would be, again, that the four corners of the

16

holographic will setting forth that the executor be the

17

sole devisee was in fact the intention of his brother and

18

to exclude the other child, his son.

19

The probate attorney raised also two additional

20

parties as potential pretermitted heirs, and I have a

21

signed and notarized statement by the wife of the decedent

22

that neither individual, Everett Wright Jones nor Debra

23

Allen, was a child, natural child or adopted child.

24

THE COURT:

Counsel, you're going to have to

25

establish the issue of this pretermitted heir problem by

26

some testimony that something more than just that he —

27

intent is expressed in the will.

28

his

I think the statute is clear that you not only

1

have to show that he intended to exclude an heir but that

2

he knew that the heir existed, and that's the problem I

3

think you have, and I don't know —

4

testimony on that*

5

MR. BRIESEMEISTER:

you have to put on

Your Honor, we have his brother

6

who is prepared to testify that not only did the testator

7

know the existence of his son

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. BRIESEMEISTER:

10

—

Then put him on.
Yes, Your Honor.

I call Spencer Jones.

11
12
13
14

SPENCER JONES,
a petitioner's witness, was sworn and testified as follows:
THE CLERK:

15

Raise your right hand, sir.

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you may

16

give in the cause now pending before this court shall b e

17

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so

18

help you God.

19

THE WITNESS:

20

THE CLERK:

21
22

I do.
Please be seated, sir, and state your

name, please.
THE WITNESS:

Spencer Jones.

23
24
25
26
27
28

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BRIESEMEISTER:
Q

Mr. Jones, are you the brother of the deceased

Herbert Lee Jones?
A

Right.

1

Q

And prior to Mr. Jones' death did you have

2

occasion to discuss with Mr. Jones the will that he was to

3

execute and to whom he wanted his estate to be

4

distributed?

5

A

He wanted it all to go to his daughter Linda.

6

Q

Linda Cameron, who's the executor in this

7

estate?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Do you recall any specific conversations during

10

which Mr. Jones said that he wanted to exclude his son

11

Robert Lee Jones?

12

A

Well, he wouldn't allow him on the property.

13

didn't want to have nothing to do with him and told him

14

so.

15

Q

He

And do you recall whether Mr. Jones in addition

16

made any comments to you about wanting his estate to go to

17

Linda Cameron and none of it to go Robert Lee Jones?

18
19

A

I know that's the way he wanted it. He same as

told me so.

20

THE COURTs

21

THE WITNESS: Well

22

THE COURT: When was the conversation?

23
24
25
26
27
28

present?

What did he say to you, sir?
~
Who was

And what was said?

THE WITNESS: Well, just he and I, but then we were
talking.
THE COURT:

Every time you were talking, and that was

7 0 years, I presume.
Let's get the specific dates and time.

1

THE WITNESS:

Well, I would say that in the last

2

three or four years before he passed away is when he was

3

having a problem with his son.

4

THE COURT:

What kind of problems was he having?

5

THE WITNESS:

Well, he wasn't very reliable.

I guess

6

he was dipping into the bank account.

My brother was a

7

little bit disabled; he was blind and

—

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

THE COURT:

His son was around? is that correct?

was around your brother?
THE WITNESS:

Well, the son was there part of the

time, but he didn't live there very long.
THE COURT:

Well, then at or about the time that this

will was made where was the son residing?
THE WITNESS:

I really don't know. He was up around

the foothills up north of Pomona somewhere•
THE COURT:

And when was the last conversation that

17

you had with your brother wherein he mentioned anything

18

about this son?

19

THE WITNESS:

Well, in the hospital he had been

20

operated on for cancer.

21 J

tell his son that he was in the hospital.

22

him around at all.

23
24
25
26
27
28

He

THE COURT:

He didn't want him ~

anybody to

He didn't want

When was the will made in relationship to

this hospitalization?
THE WITNESS:

Made right while he was in bed.

I

wasn't in the room, but I knew about it.
THE COURT:

Did he say anything to you, while was in

the hospital, about his son?

1
2

THE WITNESS:

want him to know anything about him being in the hospital.

3

THE COURT:

4

THE WITNESS:

5

THE COURT:

6
7

Every time he was mentioned he didn't

But did he tell you that?
He told it directly to me,
Okay.

Who are these other people?
MR. BRIESEMEISTER:

Your Honor, there were two

8

others, Everett Wright Jones and Debra Allen, who

9

apparently had resided with the testator during the period

10

of time approximately when the will was executed.

11

I have a statement that has been notarized

12

October 29, 1987 by one Mary Sumner, who was married to

13

decedent.

14

THE COURT:

Offer it, please.

15

MR. BRIESEMEISTER:

I might also add, Your Honor,

16

that notwithstanding the filing of 1080 petition, there has

17

been no statement of interest filed by either the son

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

THE COURT:

All right.

The order will be granted as prayed.

The court finds that the deceased knew of and
intended to exclude the child.
Attorney order.
MR. BRIESEMEISTER:

Very well, Your Honor.

Thank you very much.

26

(Proceedings concluded.)

28

The

affidavit will be ordered filed*

25

27

—
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2
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3
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4
5
In the Estate of
6
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7
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11

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

12

)
)
)

ss

I, WILLI D. HILL, Official Reporter of the

13
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14
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15
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16
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prior motion to withdraw is required. E.g., 1. Wills *»158
Lancaster. In either scenario, an evidenA confidential relationship, required
tiary hearing must ordinarily be held un- for presumption of undue influence, arises
less the record of a prior hearing shows when one party, after having gained the
petitioner is clearly not entitled to relief. trust and confidence of another, exercises
See, e.g., Lancaster. If the direct route of extraordinary influence over the other parfiling a motion to withdraw is selected, ty.
further review must be in the form of
appeal from denial of the motion and fail- 2. Wills *=>163(2)
ure to appeal would ordinarily be concluIf a confidential relationship exists besive. E.g., Wells. However, where the tween two parties to a transaction, and if
failure to appeal from denial of the motion the superior party benefits from the transis due to counsel's omission or other good action, a presumption of undue influence is
cause, review of the denial may be had by raised.
collateral action. E.g., Chess v. Smith.
proper resolution of the collateral action 3. Wills «=»163(2)
will require an evidentiary hearing unless
The relationship of parent and child is
review of the transcript of the hearing on not evidence of such confidential relationthe motion to withdraw permits a decision ship as to create presumption of undue
as a matter of law. E.g., Lancaster.
influence.
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ.,
concur.
(O

| MY NUMNR SYSTEM^

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF
Herbert Lee JONES, Deceased,
?.

4. Wills 0=163(4)
Undue influence by daughter, in the
absence of a confidential relationship with
father, would not be presumed solely because she actively participated in a drafting
and execution of father's will under which
she was sole beneficiary.
5. WUls «=>166(4)
Substantial evidence supported finding
that there was no confidential relationship
and no undue influence exercised by daughter who drafted and was sole beneficiary of
her father's will

Robert Lee JONES, Appellant
No. 880121-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 8, 1988.
Son objected to probate of father's will
drafted by daughter. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J., denied son's objections and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J.,
held that (1) substantial evidence supported finding that there was no confidential relationship and no undue influence,
and (2) son was a pretermitted child.
Vacated and remanded.

6. Wills «=»489(5)
Unequivocal language of pretermitted
child statute providing that testator's failure to provide in his or her will for a child
then living is presumptively intentional unless intent to omit "appears from the will"
itself, rendered evidence outside the four
corners of an unambiguous will, including
declarations of the decedent, inadmissible
to rebut statutory presumption that testator's failure to provide for living child in
his will was unintentional. U.C.A.1953, 752-302(lXa).
7. Descent and Distribution «=»47(2)
A testamentary disposition of entire
estate is alone insufficient to establish that

^ 4 6 Utah
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omission o{ a child from a will is intentional. U.C.A.1953, 7&-2-302(lXa).
8. Descent and Distribution *»47(2)
To rebut statutory presumption
against disinheritance, a will must either
mention claimant child by name or fairly
and clearly express an intention on the part
of testator to exclude claimant as part of a
mentioned group or class.
9. Descent and Distribution *»47(2)
Statutory presumption against disinheritance of son was not rebutted by words
of will "granting" daughter "to be sole
beneficiary" of estate, and since no mention of son was made either by name or by
class, son was pretermitted child. U.C.A.
1953, 75-2-302(lXa).

Stephen D Swindle, R. Stephen Marshall
(argued), Thomas E. Nelson, Salt Lake
City, for appellant, Robert Lee Jones, Van
Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy.
Alan M. Williams (argued), West Jordan,
for respondent, Linda Cameron.
Before JACKSON, BENCH and
GARFF, JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
Robert Lee Jones appeals from the judgment and order denying his objections to
probate of a will drafted by his sister,
Linda Cameron, and concluding he was not
entitled to a share of his father's estate as
a pretermitted child. He presents three
principal issues: (1) Should the trial court
have presumed as a matter of law that
there was undue influence exerted by his
sister either because of the mere fact of
the father/daughter relationship or because she was the drafter of the will and
its sole beneficiary? (2) Even without the
operation of such a presumption, is the trial
court's failure to find either a confidential
relationship or no undue influence clearly
erroneous? (3) Even if the will is valid, is
he nonetheless entitled. to an intestate
share of his father's estate as a pretermitr

2d SERIES

ted child? We vacate the judgment and
order of the trial court
Linda Cameron ("Cameron") and Robert
Lee Jones ("Robert") are the surviving natural children of Herbert Lee Jones
("Jones"), who died in Salt Lake County on
July 5, 1985 after living with Cameron for
approximately two monthSc In late April,
1985, Jones was admitted to a California
hospital for cancer surgery. When Cameron found this out, she travelled to California and visited Jones in the hospital on
April 30c He expressed concern about his
salvage grease business affairs and bills
and asked her to take care of them. After
looking through his papers for many hours
that night, she returned to the hospital on
May 1 and told Jones he needed to sign a
power of attorney so she could put her
name on his checking account and conduct
his affairs. When he assented, she handwrote the contested document, which initially stated:
1 May 1985
I, HERBERT LEE JONES grant power
of ATTORNEY to my daughter; LINDA
M. CAMERON.
During the ensuing conversation, as reported by Cameron, Jones indicated that—if he
didn't make it—he didn't want Robert to
get anything from his estate; he wanted
Cameron to have it all. Cameron told him
if that was so, he needed a will, to which
Jones responded, "Okay. Do it" Carney
on then changed the period after her name
to a comma and added the following words
to the previously drafted document
AND TO BE EXECUTER [sic] AND
SOLE BENEFICIARY TO
MY ESTATE.
Cameron then read the document to her
father. He looked at it and signed it in the
presence of two witnesses, Volita Jones
and Terri Hurst The trial court found
that the second part had already been added to the document when Jones signed it
although Robert disputed that point
Robert agreed that the May 1 document
qualified as a will, but challenged its admission to probate on the grounds that his
father lacked testamentary capacity and
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that the document was obtained by Cameron's undue influence. He also claimed
that, even if the will was not so obtained,
he was entitled to an intestate share of his
father's estate as a pretermitted child under Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-302(1) (1978)
because the will itself did not show an
intention to disinherit him. At trial. Robert
repeatedly objected to the admission of
statements made by Jones to Cameron and
others to prove Jones's intent to disinherit
his son. including statements that Jones
believed Robert had stolen some money
from him.
The trial judge made the following relevant findings: Jones had testamentary capacity when the wfll was executed; there
was no confidential relationship between
Cameron and her father at the time she
drafted the document for him; and the
making of the will was not procured by her
undue influence. The trial judge concluded
that the language of the will itself showed
the intent of the decedent to intentionally
omit Robert from the will, thereby precluding him from taking any part of Jones's
estate by virtue of the operation of the
pretermitted child statute. He added that,
if the extrinsic evidence of Jones's oral
declarations was considered, it would only
reinforce that conclusion.
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP AND
UNDUE INFLUENCE
[1.2] A confidential relationship arises
when one party, after having gained the
trust and confidence of another, exercises
extraordinary influence over the other par*
ty. Webster v. Lekmer, 742 P.2d 1203.
1206 (Utah 1987). If a confidential relationship exists between two parties to a
transaction, and if the superior party (in

whom trust has been reposed) benefits
from the transaction, a presumption of undue influence * is raised. Von Hake v.
Thomas 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985);
Robertson v. Campbell, 674 PM 1226
(Utah 1983). In such a case, the burden
shifts to the superior party to prove the
absence of any unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence. Baker v. Pattee, 684
P.2d 632, 637 (Utah 1984).
A few relationships are presumed to be
confidential, such as that of attorney and
client Webster, 742 P.2d at 1206; see In
re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d
682 (1956). In all other relationships the
existence of a confidential relationship is a
question of fact Webster, 142 P.2d at
1206; Baker, 684 P.2d at 636.
On appeal. Robert asserts that, as a matter of law, a confidential relationship
should have been presumed between Jones
and Cameron as parent and child, giving
rise in turn to a presumption that she exerted undue influence over him in order to
be named as his sole beneficiary under the
will.
[3] The doctrine of confidential relationship rests upon the principle of inequality
between the parties and implies a position
of superiority occupied by one of the par*
ties over another. Bradbury v. Rasmus*
sen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710, 718
(1966). However, the mere relationship of
parent and child does not constitute evidence of such confidential relationship as to
create a presumption of undue influence.
Nelson v. Nelson, 80 Utah 2d 80, 513 P.2d
1011, 1018 (1*78);' Bradbury, 401 P.2d at
718.*
While kinship may be a factor in deter*
mining the existence of a legally signifi-.

1. In the context of a testamentary disposition, 2. Accord Clow v. Chkafo Tttk 6 Trust Co» 9
"undue influence" may be established
IlUpp^d 16S, 292 NJL2d 44 (1972); Burns v.
without showing any physical coercion or reAfotto, 252 Iowa 306, 105 N.W.2d 217 (I960);
statist.... fflx whateverformIt steyttppeer
Obo* « Mtrxbman, 233 Kan. lOSl 66S PJd 147
it must, nevertheless, be made to appear from
(1983); Piatt *. Pbtzki, 277 Mich. 700. 270 N.W.
competent evidence that the will of the one
192 (1937); WuUtts v. WUUtts, 254 N.C 136,118
accused of practicing undue influence domi$.Z2d 548 (mi); EOis v. Potter, 455 ?2d 92
nated the will of the testator—that the testa*
(OkLApp.2969); JmarsoU v. JnfrsoU. 263 Or.
mem is in fact and effect the will of the
376, 502 P.2d 59a (1972); Estat* of Wann. 176
accused and not that of the testator.
Pa£uper. 498, 108 JL2d 820 (1954); lacomatti v.
In rt Bryan's Estate, S2 Utah 390, 25 P.2d 602. PrasswOi, 494 S.W.2d 496 (TennApp.1973).
610(1933).
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cant confidential relationship, there must
be a showing, in addition to the kinship, a
reposal of confidence by one party and
the resulting superiority and influence on
the other party
Mere confidence in
one person by another is not sufficient
alone to constitute such a relationship.
Bradbury, 401 P.2d at 713.
Without distinguishing Nelson and
Bradbury, in which the transacting parties
were parents and their child or one raised
as their child, appellant bases his argument
on the general statement, in a case involving only a trustor/trustee relationship, that
"[t]here are a few relationships (such as
parent-child, attorney-client, trustee-cestui)
which the law presumes to be confidential."
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302
(Utah 1978). This unsupported obiter dieturn was, unfortunately, reiterated in Baker, 684 P.2d at 637, another case in which
no familial relationship between the transacting parties was claimed
Notwithstanding this dicta, we believe
that the rule in Bradbury reflects the current state of Utah law, Le.v the relationship
of parent and child does not, in and of
itself, establish a confidential relationship
giving rise to a presumption of unfair dealing., The Bradbury opinion has been recently cited and quoted with approval for
its pronouncements on confidential relationships in general. See Webster, 742 P.2d at
1206; Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 769. More
importantly, subsequent to Baker, the
unanimous court cited Nelson and Bradbury as authority for its conclusion that a
relationship as brother and sister-in-law is
not sufficient, standing alone, to prove a
confidential relationship, although the existence of a confidential relationship could
be proved otherwise. Cunningham v.
3. Appellant also makes an unsupported argument thai, even in the absence of a confidential
relationship, undue influence by Cameron
should be presumed as a matter of law because
she actively participated in the drafting and
execution of the will under which she is sole
beneficiary. His position is, however, contrary
to the rule set forth in In re Bryan's Estate, 25
?2d at 609-610, that the presumption of undue
influence applies in these circumstances if the
beneficiary was in a confidential relationship

Cunningham,
1984).

690 P.2d 549, 563 (Utah

[4] Because there is no presumption of
a confidential relationship arising solely
from the fact that parties to a transaction
are parent and child, the trial court correctly declined to find a confidential relationship as a matter of law and left the burden
on Robert to prove that there was, in fact,
a confidential relationship and undue influence.1
[5] In its findings of fact, the trial court
determined that no such relationship existed at the time the will was drafted and
executed and that no undue influence had
been exerted on Jones. The findings of the
trial court on these questions must be given considerable deference and will only be
reversed on appeal if they are clearly erroneous. Webster, 742 P.2d at 1206. See
Utah R.Civ.Pe 52(a). Because there is substantial record evidence to support these
findings, we will not disturb them on appeal
PRETERMITTED CHILD
Appellant next argues that he is entitled
to an intestate share of his father's estate
in spite of the May 1 will because the
language of the will itself does not sufficiently evidence Jones's intent to disinherit
him.
The relevant provisions of the statute in
effect at the time of Jones's death state:
(1) If a testator fails to provide in his
will for any of his children or issue of a
deceased child, the omitted child or issue
receives a share in the estate equal in
value to that which he would have received if the testator had died intestate
unless:
with the testator. See Miller v. Livingstone, 31
Utah 415. SS P. 338, 342 (1906) (rejecting any
presumption of undue influence by one who
directs the drafting of a will under which he or
she is to take as sole beneficiary). See also the
cases reaching a similar result collected in Annotation, Presumption or Inference of Undue Influence from Testamentary Gift to Relative,
friend, or Associate of Person Preparing Will or
Procuring its Execution, 13 A.LJL3d 381, 390-97
(1967).

JSTATE OF JONES •• JONES

Jtah 349

QUM799 PJd 343 (UtaaApp. IMS)

(a) It appears from the will that the
omission was intentional[.]
Utah Code Ann. J 75-2-302(lXa) (1978)
(emphasis added).4
Construing a prior pretermission statute
allowing a child omitted from a parent's
will to take an intestate share "unless it
appears that such omission was intentional/' • the Utah Supreme Court held that the
testator's failure to provide for a child or
issue of a deceased child constituted a rebuttable presumption that the omission
was unintentional. In re NevoelVs Estate,
78 Utah 463, 5 P.2d 230, 236-37 (1931). In
the absence of the more restrictive statutory language "from the will," emphasized
above, evidence extrinsic to the will itself,
including declarations of the testator, was
held admissible to rebut the presumption
and establish that the omission was intentional. Id. 5 P.2d at 236.
The statute applicable in the instant case
still extends the presumption against disinheritance to children born before execution
of the will. See id.; EstaU of Uliscni, 372
N.W.2d 759, 761 (Minn.App.1985) (applying
pretermission statute that, like Utah's, covers living and afterborn children). Thus, it
was Cameron's burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the omission of Robert was intentional. See In re
NewelVs Estate, 5 P.2d at 24CM1; Estate
ofErvin, 399 N.W.2d 200, 201 (Minn^pp.
1987).
[6] We agree with appellant, however,
that the holding in Newell pertaining to the

admissibility of extrinsic evidence was superseded by the legislature's adoption of
the quoted language, Le., unless "it appears from the will," in section 76-2302(lXa) (1978). In construing any legislative enactment, we must give effect to the
legislature's underlying intent, American
Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah
1984), and assume that each term in the
statute was used advisedly. West Jordan
v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982).
The plain meaning of the restrictive language in section 75-2-302UXa) (1978) is
that a testator's failure to provide in his or
her will for a child then living is presumptively unintentional unless an intent to omit
"appears from the will" itself. See 2 W.
Page, Page on Wills § 21.109 at 551, 553
(W. Bowe & D. Parker ed. 1960). This
unequivocal statutory language renders evidence outside the four corners of an unambiguous will, including declarations of the
decedent, inadmissible to rebut the statutory presumption.* Accord Estate of
Smith, 9 CaL3d 74, 106 CaLRptr. 774, 507
P.2d 78 (1973); Smith v. Crook, 160 CaL
App.3d 245, 206 CaLRptr. 524 (1984) (California statute, like Utah's, sayB "unless it
appears from the will that such omission
was intentional"); /* the Matter of the
Estate of Hilton, 98 N.M. 420, 649 P.2d 488
(App.1982) (interpreting identical statutory
subsection), cert denied, 98 N.M. 478, 649
P.2d 1391; In re EstaU of Cooke, 96 Idaho
48, 524 P.2d 176, 182 (1973) (statute says
"unless it appears that such omission was

4. Under the statute is recently amended by
after the effective date of the 1988 amendment
Laws 19SS. ch. 110, § 2 (effective April 25.
to this section.
1988), only those children who were born or
adopted after the execution of a will (or, if 5.
When any testator omits to provide in his
deceased, their isst") can claim a share in a
will for any of his children or for the issue of
parent's estate as a pretermitted child. Utah
any deceased child, unless it appears that such
Code Ann. § 75-2-302(lXa) (1988). This
omission was intentional such child or the
change brings Utah's pretermitted child statute
issue of such child must have the same share
more in line with Uniform Probate Code
in the estate of the testator as if he had died
§ 2-302 (19S2) (although the UPC provision
intestate....
does not apply to the issue of deceased after1917 Utah CompXaws § 6341.
born children), which is based on the presumption that a testator's failure to provide for a
child living at the time the will was executed 6. The statements to the contrary in Wellman &
Gordon, Uniformity m State Inheritance Laws:
was intentional See note 7, infra: Comment,
Articles U and ID of the Uniform Probau Code as How UPC Article I! Has fared in Nine Enact*
Enacted m Utah, 1976 B.Y.UJ-Rev. 425. 434.
menu, 1976 B.Y.UJLRev. 357, 373 and BYU
Because appellant was alive at the time his
Journal of Legal Studies, Summary of Utah Profather's will was executed, be would have no
bau Law 86 (1986) should, therefore, be disclaim as a pretermitted child if Jones had died
regarded.
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intentional"); Crump v. Freeman, 614
P.2d 1096, 1097 (Okl.1980) (same statutory
language as in Cooke). See Royce v. Estate of Denby, 117 N.H. 893, 379 A.2d
1256,1258 (1977). The purpose of the pretermission statute is to protect the omitted
child's right to take unless the will itself
gives clear expression to an intentional
omission. See Crump, 614 P.2d at 1097.
Although this part of the Utah statute
has been criticized as tending to defeat a
testator's actual intent and prevent intentional disinheritance,7 it is not our function
to relegislate and set out a rule different
from that clearly expressed in the statute.
See In the Matter of Jackson, 117 N.H.
898, 379 A.2d 832, 835 (1977). As the editorial board comment to section 75-2-502
(copied from the official comment to Uniform Probate Code § 2-302) points out, any
potentially harsh results can be avoided by
the testator.
To preclude operation of this section it
is not necessary to make any provision,
even nominal in amount, for a testator's
present or future children; a simple recital in the will that the testator intends
to make no provision for then living children o o. would meet the requirement of
subdivision 1(a).
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-302 editorial board
comment (1978).
[7-9] The only relevant words appear*
ing within the confines of Jones's terse will
are those "granting" Cameron "to be sole
beneficiary" of his estate. There is no
mention of Robert by name or by class.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the
trial court, we hold that this language is
insufficient to rebut the statutory presump7. Wellman 6 Gordon, supra note 6, at 373-74.
[Uniform Probate Code] Section 2-302 is designed ... to support testamentary intention
by mitigating the effects of unintentional

tion that Jones unintentionally failed to
provide for his son in his will. A testamentary disposition of the entire estate is alone
insufficient to establish that the omission
of a child from a will is intentional
Crump, 614 P.2d at 1099. In order to rebut
the statutory presumption, the testator's
intent to disinherit a child living at the time
of the will's execution must appear in
strong and convincing language on the face
of the will. See Smith v. Crook, 206 Cai.
Rptr. at 526. The will must either mention
the claimant child by name or fairly and
clearly express an intention on the part of
the testator to exclude the claimant as part
of a mentioned group or class. In re Matter of the Estate of Hilton, 649 P.2d at
495. See Estate ofHirschi 113 Cal.App.3d
681, 170 CaLRptr. 186, 188 (1980); Estate
of Hester, 671 P.2d 54 (Okl.1983).
Because the statutory presumption
against disinheritance stands unrehutted,
the trial court erroneously held that Robert
was not a pretermitted child under our
statute. Accordingly, the judgment and
order of the trial court is vacated and the
case is remanded for entry of judgment in
favor of appellant in accordance with this
opinion. We have considered the remaining issues raised by the parties and find
them meritless. No costs are awarded.
GARFF and BENCH, JJ., concur.
(o
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disinheritance. When a living child is omitted from a will, however, it is probable that
the omission was intentional.
UL at 373.

EXHIBIT D

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
Attorneys for Petitioner Robert E. Jones
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate
of

ORDER

HERBERT LEE JONES,

Probate No. 85-736

deceased
The following matters came on for hearing before the
Honorable James S. Sawaya of the above-entitled court on January
16, 1990, at 9:00 a.m.:

Petition for an Order Confirming the

Prior Decision of Formal Probate of the Decedent's Will and for
Formal Appointment of Linda Anglesey as Personal Representative;
for an Order Decreeing that Robert Lee Jones is a Pretermitted
Child as Determined by the Decision of the Utah Appellate Court;
for an Order Approving the Final Accounting; and for Discharge of
the Personal Representative, and an Amended Counter-Petition for
an Order Denying the Personal Representative's Petition for
Approval of Final Settlement, an Order Requiring the Personal
Representative to Provide an Accounting of all Property,

-1-

Including the Property'in the State of California; for an Order
Decreeing that Robert Lee Jones is a Pretermitted Heir; for
Denying Attorney Fees; for Formal Appointment of Robert Lee Jones
as Successor Personal Representative; and for an Order Requiring
the Personal Representative to Surrender all Records,
Accountings, and other Documents, or Post Bond.

Petitioner

Anglesey was represented by Richard L. Halliday of the law firm
of Neider, Ward, & Hutchinson.

Counterpetitioner Jones was

represented by R. Stephen Marshall of the law firm of Van Cott,
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy.

Having heard the argument of

counsel and having considered the memoranda filed by the parties,
and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

That Robert Lee Jones is a pretermitted heir.

2.

That the California decree awarding the real

property owned by the decedent, Herbert Lee Jones, at the time of
his death to Linda Anglesey was wholely invalid and that said
property or the proceeds from the sale thereof should be
distributed to all the heirs of the decedent.
3.

That Linda Anglesey is not removed from her

position as Personal Representative.
4.

That the Personal Representative, Linda Anglesey

is required to post a bond in the sum of one-half (1/2) of the
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amount of'the entire estate including the value of all real and
personal property or the proceeds from the sale thereof.
5,

That the Court reserves its ruling on the Personal

Representative's petition to close the estate and distribute the
assets and on the Personal Representative's request for
attorney's fees.
DATED this

day of February, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

James S. Sawaya
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Order to be hand-delivered, this lb

day of

February, 1990, to the following:
Richard L. Halliday
Neider, Ward & Hutchinson
7050 Union Park Avenue, Suite 420
Midvale, Utah 84047
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